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THERE OUGHT TO BE A LAW:
THE DISCLOSURE

Focus

OF RECENT

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR
NONPROFIT REFORM

This Article explores and evaluates the disclosure focus of recent legislative proposals for nonprofit reform. It begins by describing legislative proposals under consideration in various states and the U.S. Senate Finance Committee. This summary
demonstrates the emphasis these proposals place on disclosure as a technique for
enhancing nonprofit accountability. The Article then evaluates the ability of such
disclosure mechanisms to achieve nonprofit accountability gains by improving the
behavior of nonprofit actors, facilitating nonprofit enforcement by regulators or
others, or both. Unfortunately, due to the structure and characteristics of nonprofit
organizations and the resources available for nonprofit enforcement, this analysis
reveals that disclosure-based reforms alone will do little to improve nonprofit accountability. Thus, the Article concludes by urging legislators to refocus their reform
energies around invigorating enforcement, and to adopt disclosure-based reforms
only when they will complement enforcement efforts without undermining nonprofits' ability to pursue their missions.
NONPROFIT INTERJURISDICTIONALITY

Norman L Silber

The federal system of "dual sovereignties" guarantees that most American legal
regimes tolerate jurisdictional overlap between the enforcement authority of federal
and state agencies. This Article explores interjurisdictional overlap in the context of
nonprofit legal supervision. Notwithstanding the common assumption that "states
police mission while the IRS polices money," it is suggested here that the overlap has
become much broader than generally has been supposed; that over a wide range of
common misconduct among the preponderance of organizations in the nonprofit sector, either the Internal Revenue Service or state authorities could, if they wanted to
and in no particular order, exercise statutory or common law authority to prosecute
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nonprofit charities, including their officers and directors. As a policy matter, this
overlap has generally been viewed as positive by both state and federal officials, who
can defer or shift the burden of supervision to avoid spending scarce resources, to
avoid political difficulty, or for other reasons. In many cases, they can build on one
another's work, use the legal precedent established by one another's litigation, or act
in independent disregard of it. They can act first, second, or not at all. If legislation
currently being considered becomes law, furthermore, it may become easier than
ever for regulators to coordinate their activities and to share information; but the
lines of authority will not (as a general matter) become more sharply drawn. This
Article raises several disadvantages that result from the increasing breadth of overlap, including erratic and inconsistent growth in the law, unpredictable law enforcement, a lack of accountability and responsibility for supervision, and some confusion
among nonprofit counselors and the organizations they advise. It offers some suggestions for new lines and for redelineating authority along historical lines.
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GOT To
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The traditionally distinct regimes for governing charitable trusts and nonprofit
corporations have been conforming. At the same time, by continuing to make distinctions based on organizational form rather than structure and operations, we
might be asking the wrong questions. To what extent do trusts and corporations have
irreducible legal differences? Key issues that initially appear unique to trust law on
closer inspection turn out to apply to some or all corporate charities-and corporate
doctrine might be more appropriate for charitable trusts having a broad governing
board, In the end, the distinction between "trust law" and "corporate law" might
make less sense than identifying what legal principles of governance should apply to
charities with multiple, independent fiduciaries, and what (if any) different legal principles should apply to charities governed by only a single fiduciary, or a small number
of fiduciaries (particularly if they are related).
LET CHARITABLE DIRECTORS DIRECT:
WHY TRUST LAW SHOULD NOT CURB
BOARD DISCRETION OVER A CHARITABLE
CORPORATION'S MISSION AND
UNRESTRICTED ASSETS

Robert A. Katz

What are the legal limits on a charity's ability to change its mission and redirect
donations to new purposes? The answer often turns on the charity's legal form,
whose essential elements are encapsulated in a few nonmandatory default rules. Absent extraordinary circumstances, a charitable trust's controllers (a.k.a. "trustees")
may not deviate from the specific charitable purposes selected by the trust's creator
(a.k.a. the "settlor"), unless the settlor expressly expanded the trustees' discretion.
By contrast, a nonprofit corporation's controllers (a.k.a. its "board of directors") are
typically free to change the charitable purpose and redeploy donations, unless the
corporate charter or a gift instrument expressly curtails its authority to do so. In
recent years, the wide scope of board discretion has aggravated concerns about nonprofit accountability. To address these concerns, some commentators seek to import
more restrictive, trust law default rules into nonprofit corporate law. This Article
criticizes this program of "trust law parallelism" on grounds that it will increase the
costs of charitable activity and thereby deter philanthropy. It will curtail the diversity
of off-the-rack legal forms available for charitable endeavors, and therefore increase
the transaction costs of philanthropists who favor more discretion for controllers.
Moreover, because many philanthropists will be unaware of the restrictive default
rules, they will not know to opt out of them, even if they favor more discretion or
have no opinion on the matter. As a result, boards will be restrained to an extent that
does not enhance accountability. At bottom significant restraints on board discretion
over the mission are socially costly: they impair a board's ability to respond to changing needs and fresh opportunities, which facilitates the application of charitable resources to more socially valuable uses.
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CHARITABLE ACCOUNTABILITY AND REFORM
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND:

THE CASE OF THE CHARITY COMMISSION

James I. Fishman
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Fraudulent behavior by charitable fiduciaries brings universal condemnation.
However, disapprobation by itself never has translated into an efficient system for
the accountability of charitable assets. This Article examines the nineteenth-century
struggle to form a charity commission to oversee English charitable endowments and
the ultimately disappointing result. Administrative reform can have an interminable
germination as the creation of the Charity Commission demonstrates. Even though
the need for reform of charitable trust administration was long recognized and a
consensus reached on the structure of the oversight body though not its scope, the
resulting agency came under almost immediate criticism and was disliked, disrespected, deprived of resources, and ultimately ineffective.
Why is it so difficult to carry out effective institutional change? Why did the
principle of charitable accountability, a nearly unanimously supported ideal, ring so
hollow in practice? This Article offers hypotheses about the difficulties of administrative reform through the prism of the nineteenth century that may apply more
broadly. Many of the problems that hindered the Charity Commission: inadequate
resources, increasing numbers of charities, resistance to increased oversight by affected interest groups, and a lack of influence in government face contemporary regulators of the nonprofit sector.

NEW CHARITY REGULATION PROPOSALS
FOR ENGLAND AND WALES:
OVERDUE OR OVERDONE?

Debra Morris

779

One of the most important aspects of modern governance of any organisation,
whether a charity, a commercial entity or a governmental department is the emphasis
on greater openness and accountability. This is partly a response to a breakdown of
trust in government processes, which is evident, for example, in the intense media
scrutiny of the decision to go to war with Iraq. It is also a response to the breakdown
in trust in commercial governance and professional self-regulation, as demonstrated,
for example, by the collapses of Enron in the USA and what might yet be regarded
as its European counterpart, Parmalat.
The fact that many charities receive public subsidies in one form or another
(from government funding, to funds raised from the public, through to reliance on
volunteers) makes it all the more important that they operate in a transparent manner. This Article will consider recent attempts in England and Wales to improve accountability within the charitable sector.
In May 2003, a draft Charities Bill was published taking forward the longawaited review of charity law. The draft bill, which will "modernise charity law and
better enable charities to prosper" contains a series of measures outlined by the British government in July 2003. This was in response to the consultation document from
the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, published in September 2002, in which wideranging changes in the law and regulation of the charitable and wider not-for-profit
sector were proposed.
This Article will focus on two of the main aims of the proposed reforms: developing greater accountability and transparency to build trust in the sector; and, maintaining that trust by independent, open, and proportionate regulation.

THE GUARDIANS GUARDING THEMSELVES:

A

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON

NONPROFIT SELF-REGULATION

Mark Sidel

This Article explores regulation of the nonprofit sector by the sector itselfwhat we generally call "self-regulation." This is an increasingly important topic as
federal and state legislators and executive branch officials, as well as the press and
investigative organizations, call for stricter scrutiny and oversight of the American
nonprofit sector in the wake of a host of scandals and glaring failures-and as the
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nonprofit sector and reasonable regulators seek to balance the role of government
regulation with appropriate efforts by the sector to police itself. The Article discusses
several detailed models for nonprofit self-regulation in Asia, as well as issues involving nonprofit self-regulation in the United States and in Asia. It seeks to analyze
several emerging trends in nonprofit self-regulation, including the emergence of nonprofit associational entrepreneurs that have taken up self-regulation with vigor, and
the increasing role of government in sponsoring and supporting self-regulation
initiatives.
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Catherine L. Fisk
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Metaphor and narrative have played a crucial role in shaping perceptions of the
nature of employment relations. Lawyers, judges, and firms have long been "narrative entrepreneurs," deploying metaphor and story strategically to shape the legal
culture of work. When AT&T cut 40,000 jobs in one year, its Vice President of
Human Resources said from then on all workers should regard themselves as "selfemployed ...vendors who come to this company to sell their skills." The metaphor
suggested that all formerly career employees were now "contingent" in the sense that
they suddenly had the same employment contract as day laborers. The law of employment contracts has been powerfully influenced by the metaphor of the corporation as a person, which conceptualizes an internal labor "market" as a ladder. The
legal obligations of corporate managers vis-a-vis shareholders (greater) and employees (lesser) likewise have been affected. An alternative metaphor-that a corporation is a network of people bound by a variety of contractual and other
relationships-might have led to dramatically different laws regarding ownership and
control of employee innovation, protections for low-level but nominally supervisory
workers, and the structure of proof in discrimination cases.
The new economy is characterized by dramatic changes in the labor market
brought about by globalization, the decline of career jobs, and the steady decline of
union density. This Article explores the ways in which dominant legal metaphors
about corporations, about work, and about workplace knowledge and the nature and
origins of innovation have become increasingly inapt in the new economy. The principal focus of the Article is the metaphors surrounding innovation and intellectual
property, and the metaphors concerning employment security and the allocation of
risk of unemployment; poor health, or old age. Building on empirical literature showing that most innovation occurs among a network of people at multiple firms, rather
than solely among the employees of a single firm, the Article suggests a modification
of the dominant metaphor of corporate authorship of patents, copyrights, and other
"proprietary information." The "networks of innovation" metaphor suggests the
plausibility of a metaphor of "joint authorship" of workplace knowledge and the
desirability of a system allocating credit, as screen credit is given in movies or on TV.
New metaphors about the formation and content of employment "contracts" are also
explored. Finally, the Article suggests that publicly subsidized and privately administered "social insurance" is a better metaphor than "employee benefits" for capturing
the enormous social and economic importance of health, disability, and retirement
income.

THE LOUIS JACKSON NATIONAL
STUDENT WRITING COMPETITION
THE QUEST FOR A LACTATING MALE:
BIOLOGY, GENDER, AND
DISCRIMINATION

Maureen E. Eldredge

This paper analyzes employment discrimination faced by women due to unique
biological characteristics, such as breastfeeding, contraception, and infertility. The
paper discusses protection from discrimination provided by the Pregnancy Discrimi-
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nation Act, gaps in that protection, and provides suggestions for ways to improve
equal opportunity in the workplace.
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Do?

Stefanie Kastrinsky
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When Enron collapsed, many of its employees were not only out of a job, but
those who had invested a portion of their retirement savings in Enron stock watched
those funds dissipate. This unfortunate event engendered a renewed interest in ERISA section 404(c). Under ERISA section 404(c), as long as employee-participants
are in control of their 401(k) investment decisions, and the plan sponsor is prudent in
selecting fund options, the plan sponsor bears no responsibility for investment losses
incurred in participants' accounts. Although studies show that many people cannot
make truly educated investment choices, plan sponsors currently cannot offer investment advice without themselves becoming liable for the negative consequences of
that advice. In this paper, I review ERISA's statutory and regulatory framework and
outline alternatives to the investment advice dilemma, some of which would require
plan sponsors to bear fiduciary responsibility for the investment selections of 401(k)
participants.
THE BENCH TRIAL:

A

MORE BENEFICIAL

ALTERNATIVE TO ARBITRATION OF

Dianne LaRocca

TITLE VII CLAIMS

933

An increasing percentage of the workforce in the United States is covered by
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements through which employees waive their
right to bring suit under Title VII. Although these agreements are an important avenue for the resolution of disputes between employers and employees, these agreements have proved unsatisfactory. In this Article, I describe the advantages and
disadvantages of arbitration agreements for employers and employees. I then explore
whether pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements through which employees
waive their right to a jury trial and agree to a bench trial of their Title VII claims are
a more beneficial alternative. After deducting that such agreements should be held
enforceable in the Title VII context, I explore the advantages and disadvantages of
the bench trial alternative. I find the bench trial alternative avoids the disadvantages
mandatory arbitration agreements pose while maintaining most of the advantages
mandatory arbitration agreements offer. Thus, it seems that pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration agreements though which employees waive their right to a jury trial and
agree to a bench trial for their Title VII claims present a more beneficial alternative.

STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
AN END TO EMPTY DISTINCTIONS:
FEE SHIFTING, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, AND
DOE v. BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Michael Giuseppe Congiu
The long-standing "American Rule" precludes courts from awarding attorneys'
fees absent statutory authorization. Courts are also restrained by the Supreme
Court's determination that in order to "prevail" under a statute permitting a fee
award, a party must obtain some measure of judicially sanctioned relief. This Comment examines the various distinctions that courts have made between judicial and
non-judicial relief, and argues that in the context of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA"), the distinction between privately settling plaintiffs and
those obtaining court-ordered relief lacks legitimacy. The IDEA was drafted with the
purpose of ensuring appropriate educational placement for special-needs children as
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well as ensuring that disputes regarding such placement be settled promptly and free
of unnecessary disruption. Using Doe v. Boston Public Schools as an analytical backdrop, this Comment argues that the IDEA's purpose, which is amply reflected in the
text and legislative history of the statute, demonstrates that privately settling IDEA
plaintiffs should be entitled to recoup their attorneys' fees.
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IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER:
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE VIOLATIONS AND
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THE MORE-THAN-REASONABLE PERSON

K. Wendela
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The Establishment Clause prohibits any law "respecting an establishment of religion." One example of a potential Establishment Clause violation is a display of the
Ten Commandments on governmental property. The Supreme Court is on the brink
of deciding whether such a display violates the Establishment Clause, and one important question to ask when making this determination is whether a reasonable observer would view a Ten Commandments display as a governmental endorsement of
religion. The answer to this question will change based on the definition of the reasonable observer.
In Freethought Society v. Chester County, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that a display of the Ten Commandments affixed to a county courthouse
did not violate the Establishment Clause because a "reasonable observer" would not
view the display as an endorsement of religion. However the Third Circuit used the
heightened standard of a more-than-reasonable person. This standard was improper
and led to the Third Circuit reaching an erroneous conclusion. The Supreme Court
should not use this more-than-reasonable-person standard as it rules on the constitutionality of Ten Commandments displays.
WHAT'S THAT.MEAN? A PROPOSED CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION METHODOLOGY FOR

PHILLIPS V. A WH CORP.

Jessica C Kaiser 1009

The Federal Circuit has granted en banc review in Phillips v. AWH Corp. to
decide the appropriate methodology for patent claim construction. This Note examines the different approaches taken by Federal Circuit panels for claim construction:
the intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy, holistic approach, and the "dictionary first" approach. This Note tests these approaches against the policies underlying patent law
and concludes that both the holistic approach and the "dictionary first" approach fail
to adequately further these policies.
Instead, this Note proposes a modified intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy. The proposed approach for claim construction looks first to the intrinsic evidence. If the
meaning of the disputed term in the claim is clear from the intrinsic evidence, the
inquiry concludes. If the term is unclear from the intrinsic evidence, the court would
then evaluate the plausibility of the interpretations put forward by each side by examining the supporting evidence introduced by the parties. If one interpretation is
unsubstantiated by the evidence while the other is substantiated, the court should
adopt the plausible, substantiated interpretation. If, however, both interpretations
are equally plausible, the proposed methodology would have the court construe the
term against the patentee. This Note argues that this modified intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy best furthers the policies of certainty and public notice underlying patent
law.

